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There is a Native-American proverb that observes “[w]e do not
1
inherit the earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children.”
This centuries old axiom has yet to find its way into American politics.
The future of human civilization is uncertain. Our planet, undeniably, is
in peril. Humankind’s greatest challenge will be to manage our
existence and defend the rarity of complex life from self-destruction. It
is now evident that the challenge is made more arduous not solely
because of apathy or complacency but because of shortsightedness. The
power of human intellect, and its potential to eradicate our common
threats, will be measured by whether it can be coupled with lofty
ambition. Duties are needed that forecast a sense of urgency, a call for
immediate collective action that produces meaningful responses, and
legislation that protects the planet that we borrow from future
generations.
The question of whether human life, its evolution, and the
development of modern civilization have had a substantial impact on
* Juris Doctor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark, 2011; Bachelor of Arts, Brown
University, 2008. This Article is dedicated to my Janice for her unyielding love and support.
I would like to also express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to John M. Elrod, Kevin
A. McDonald, and the entire editorial board of the Seton Hall Legislative Journal for
preparing this Article for publication.
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multinl/story.cfm?ID=11595&NLID=259 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
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the planet that hosts it has been answered. Of the diverse forms of life
on Earth, only humans have manipulated their ability to alter expansive
2
areas. Half the planet’s surface has been transformed by “human
3
activity.” It is a revolution marked by the “physical impact [humans
have made on the] land [evidenced by] the lights that brighten our cities,
4
the human presence is plainly visible from space.” Human activity,
rivaled by no other species, is changing the planet’s atmospheric
composition. This activity has generated increased levels of greenhouse
5
gases (GHGs), such as carbon dioxide (CO2). Some of these GHGs
remain in the planet’s atmosphere for decades and some even centuries.
Scientists have determined with virtual certainty that atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs will continue to rise over the next few
6
decades. These emissions have led to an “unequivocal warming trend”
7
of 1.0 to 1.7 degrees Fahrenheit in the last century alone.
Its
persistence will only further warm the planet causing radical climatic
changes.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
observed that the increase in global average temperatures is likely due
8
to an “‘increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.’”
Scientists have declared that unless human activity on the planet is
dynamically altered, the “atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases [will] continue to . . . [increase and] average global temperatures
and sea levels will continue to rise as a result and precipitation patterns
9
will [irrevocably] change.” Scientists have determined with remarkable
certainty that humankind is responsible for the greatest levels of GHG
concentrations in our atmosphere, and that increased concentration
2
Earth from Space Online Exhibition, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE, http://
www.earthfromspace.si.edu/ online_exhibition_human_presence.asp (last visited Nov. 22,
2009).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Climate Change: State of Knowledge, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/stateofknowledge.html (last updated Nov. 29,
2011).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. (quoting Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.
Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html) (last visited March 18,
2012)).
9
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 5.
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10

perpetuates the planet’s warming that threatens life.
Despite this,
political will to address the impending cataclysm remains idle.
Methods for intervention remain a subject of debate. Logistics
have gotten in the way of progress. The human impulse to survive has
been quieted by a lack of ingenuity, a desire to pacify the situation
rather than to remedy it. The lauded approach in the United States
centers on GHG-emissions-reduction programs, particularly cap and
trade programs such as the one that the House of Representatives (the
House) passed on June 26, 2009, under legislation titled the American
11
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES). ACES marked the
first time that the House approved a piece of legislation aimed at
reducing GHG emissions in order to curtail the worsening effects of
12
climate change. The approved House bill’s, however, suffers from a
fundamental flaw — its inability to establish a domestic response to a
global crisis. Cap and trade, as currently designed in the House bill, is
ill-suited to implement a breakaway from the harmful activities that
have produced the catastrophic conditions that the world now sits idly
watching. The actual harm the program seeks to correct is left
unaddressed.
Cap and trade does little, if anything, to eliminate the aggregate
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. Those concentrations are
principally responsible for global warming. Cap and trade devises
schemes that do no more than restrain discharges by nominal
percentages over decades. They are impositions that, even at their most
ambitious levels, accomplish nothing more than a delay of the
inevitable. Legislation, such as the ACES bill, takes the greatest
opportunity ever afforded to human civilization to improve its quality of
life and reduces it to the greatest deferment of our collective history.
Cap and trade asserts a moral indifference because it postpones the
necessary and fails to recognize that, in dealing with climate change,
difficult decisions must be made. Inevitably, both individuals and
10

Id.
The ACES bill, also known as the Waxman-Markey bill, was narrowly approved by a
vote of 219 to 212. See American Clean Air and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. (2009), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/action_votes.
12
ACES marks the first time that the United States Congress has approved a piece of
legislation aimed at reducing GHG emissions in order to curtail the worsening effects of
climate change. See John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/
us/politics/27climate.html?_r=2&hp.
11
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nations will be weary about making concessions that derail their
economic leverage. The United States Congress, however, must
acknowledge these realities and formulate a declarative statement of
leadership. Congress has a momentous opportunity to demonstrate that
it understands the ethical weight of inaction, but, to do so, it must
observe the failure of implementing a market system that defers
necessary reductions and does little to promote a new era of innovation.
Cap and trade has garnered support because of the lack of certainty
that clouds climate change’s progression. While scientists have proven
that an increase in GHG concentration exists and that human activity is
responsible, they have been unable to answer questions that our culture
13
of immediacy expects. Determinations as to how much warming will
occur, how fast the warming will happen, and what will be its concrete
14
effect on the planet’s climate system remain unanswered. Without a
sense of urgency, market-based incentive programs will prevail. This
15
Article demonstrates why plans like the House Waxman-Markey bill
mislead our nation’s conscience by articulating that something is being
done, deluding the reality that the something is not enough.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how marketbased emission reduction programs, particularly the cap and trade
program in the House ACES bill, are intended to work and why such an
implementation delegitimizes efforts to combat global climate change.
This section highlights the inherent practical implementation flaws of
this approach, particularly, the lack of meaningful changes that ACES
purports to supply. Part II considers the emerging field of climate
change ethics and how a market-based incentive program, like a cap and
trade system, must engage the ethical considerations that govern
13

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 5.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) contends that the answers to these
questions will “require advances in scientific knowledge in a number of areas,” such as
improved insight on:
“[N]atural climatic variations, changes in the sun’s energy, land-use changes, the
warming or cooling effects of pollutant aerosols, and the impacts of changing humidity and
cloud cover;”
The comparative contribution to climate change of “human activities and natural
causes;”
Projection trends for future greenhouse emissions and “how the climate system will
respond within a narrow range;”
And, the potential for “rapid or abrupt climate change.”
Id.
15
See American Clean Air and Security Act of 2009, supra note 11.
14
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domestic responses to a global calamity. This section demonstrates how
the United Nation’s December 2009 climate change summit in
Copenhagen reasserted the importance of being able to strike an accord
that weighs the interests of both the developing and developed worlds.
Finally, part III recommends that substantial intervention that results in
a significant revolution in the way human beings relate to their
environment will require a legally cognizable moral duty from humans
to the planet that houses them.
I. WAXMAN-MARKEY’S CAP & TRADE: A FLAWED RESPONSE
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Nearly four months after the House of Representatives passed its
cap and trade measure, the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press’s October 22, 2009 poll revealed that less Americans believed
16
solid evidence of climate change existed than they previously thought.
Nevertheless, the poll does observe that sixty-five percent of people see
17
global warming as a “very or somewhat serious problem.” Of those
individuals, fifty percent reported being in favor of setting limits on
carbon emissions, “including making companies pay for emissions,
18
even if [it] led to higher energy prices.” These sentiments have only
been disavowed by Congressional support of a plan that fails to address
the imminent seriousness of climate change, a strategy that most
Americans do not completely understand or are even aware of for that
19
matter. Only twenty-three percent of Americans correctly associated
20
cap and trade with energy and the environment. If cap and trade is a
16
See Modest Support for Cap-and-Trade Policy: Fewer Americans see Solid Evidence
of Global Warming THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS,
Oct 22, 2009, http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/556.pdf. [hereinafter Pew Research
Center]. Only 57% of Americans state that they see evidence of climate change. That
number is down by 20% since 2006 and 14% since 2008. Of those surveyed only 36%
reported thinking that global warming was “caused by human activity.” See Matthew
McDermott, Just 57% of US Residents See Evidence of Global Warming & 23% Know
about Cap-and-Trade, TREEHUGGER (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.treehugger.com/
files/2009/10/57-percent-us-see-evidence-global-warming.php.
2009/10/57-percent-us-see-evidence-global-warming.php.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
A Pew Research poll indicates that only twenty-three percent of Americans know to
what cap and trade refers. 55 percent of those surveyed reported not having heard the term
before, and 30 percent asserted that they only heard a little about the program. See Pew
Research Center, supra note 16.
20
From the sampled polled, 29 percent believed cap and trade was related to health

ACEBO FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

196

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/28/2012 1:58 PM

Vol. 36:2

relatively unknown concept to the vast majority of Americans, then why
has such a plan received so much political support? The answer lies
within its market-based approach, a flawed judgment that suggests that
the market can address all our social ills. Ironically, notions that the
market is best equipped to address climate change remain prevalent
during the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression. It is
a time that reveals that, while the market has the proven potential to
generate exorbitant amounts of wealth, it can also spiral out of control,
producing consequences that no group is immune from without a
vigilant body steering it. It is in this system that the 111th United States
Congress has wagered the fate of our planet and our civilization.
Cap and trade is “politically favorable” because it is seen as
“[possessing] economic efficiency advantages over a [carbon] tax
21
[system].” Cap and trade systems control the quantity of emissions
and allow the market to determine the most desirable price. Proponents
of this system assert that it “allows science to identify the level of
22
emissions reduction necessary to achieve climate stabilization.”
Ideally, the cap is set at the “scientifically sound level,” which would
23
produce the desired emissions reductions.
Cap and trade basically functions by having the government set a
24
limit on the amount of GHGs that are emitted into the atmosphere.
25
Emissions that exceed the government limit result in fines.
The
government then disseminates a predetermined set of allowances to the
26
industry. These allowances can be distributed by being auctioned off,
given away for free based on “historic levels of pollution,” or some
27
combination of the two. The auction process is more ideal, but the
polluting industry dislikes it for the obvious reason that the alternative
28
free allocation “seemingly reward[s]” them. This system creates a
market-based incentive for industry to reduce its GHG emissions.
care, banking reform, and unemployment. Id.
21
Heather Hosterman & Brian C. Murray, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade and the
Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 707 (2009).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 707-708.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See Matthew McDermott, Cap and Trade Explained—The Short Attention Span
Version, PLANET GREEN, http://video.planetgreen.discovery.com/tech-transport/cap-tradeexplained-short.html (last visited Feb 18, 2012).
28
Id.
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Essentially, a company that emits GHGs below the amount of credits it
has been allotted can “sell those credits to some other company” that
29
has not been as successful. This process proceeds as the cap continues
to be reduced over time, thus restricting the amount of GHG that
industry can emit.
Supporters of cap and trade attest that a well-designed system can
30
decrease the costs associated with achieving a given emissions target.
A well-designed approach grants companies “flexibility” in terms of
31
how much GHGs they can emit. The price of the allowance is adjusted
through trading until emissions are brought down to the predetermined
32
cap. Ideally, this process establishes a market where allowances reach
their “highest-valued use, protecting those emissions that are the most
33
costly to reduce.” Supporters, however, recognize that the cost of
achieving substantial reductions depends on the accessibility and cost of
34
low and GHG-free technologies. These factors can be addressed in
systems that establish reduction targets well into the future because they
supply “price signals” which allow companies to invest in the research
35
and development of sustainable technologies.
Waxman-Markey’s cap and trade program, if implemented as
proposed, is susceptible to causing more irrevocable harm than it will
mitigate. The problems associated with the system’s implementation
are easily detected and for the most part can all be corrected. Private
interest lobbying, however, has made it nearly impossible for
lawmakers to address the proposal’s shortcomings. What occurs most
29
Id. Under a cap and trade system companies are required to meet the cap and thus are
left with the option of either purchasing or selling emission allowances “depending on their
pollution abatement costs and the market priced of the emissions allowance.” The
companies that manage to cut their emissions at a lower cost than the allowance’s market
value will “abate more and purchase fewer (or sell extra) allowances, while [companies] that
cannot cut their emissions below the allowance’s market value will purchase more
allowances.” See Murray, supra note 15, at 708.
30
See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Climate
Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 295 (2008), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
Stavins_Climate_Change.pdf.
31
Companies would have to appropriately relinquish “an allowance for each ton of
emissions. [Therefore companies] will undertake all emission reductions that are less costly
than the market price of an allowance.” Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Stavins, supra note 30, at 298.
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often is a further disruption of a system already designed to not
accomplish anything meaningful. Measures are now designed to solely
appear as though they are aimed at addressing a critical issue. In reality,
legislation is drafted in ways that do more harm than good, which defers
what must be done now to another generation.
Climate change is the greatest threat facing human civilization and
yet the best solution politicians and economists can come up with is a
system that lends itself to partisanship and special interest. This is
certainly the case for the recent incarnations of cap and trade proposals
in the 111th United States Congress. The Waxman-Markey cap and
trade bill, which narrowly passed the House of Representatives in the
summer of 2009, marked the first time a climate change bill was
36
adopted by either chamber of Congress. While many celebrated this as
a momentous shift in our politics, close examination raises concern for
what the bill, if approved by the United States Senate, would actually
achieve.
The House bill would place a cap on GHG emissions attributed to
37
global warming below 2005 levels. The emission reduction focuses on
38
industries accounting for eighty-five percent of the national economy.
The program’s emissions cut would start in 2012 and be completely
39
phased in by 2016, and it is scheduled to run through 2050. The
targets would progressively increase with an initial three percent cut by
2012, seventeen percent cut by 2020, forty-two percent cut by 2030, and
40
over eighty percent cut by 2050.
While the eighty-three percent cut by 2050 would appear quite
ambitious, the truth is that it is not a lofty goal at all, not when the bill is
designed to give eighty-five percent of the systems allowances away for
41
free during its first few years. The Waxman-Markey cap and trade bill
36

John M. Broder, supra note 12.
Kate Sheppard, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about the Waxman-Markey
Energy/Climate Bill—in Bullet Points, GRIST (June 3, 2009, 6:43 AM),
http://www.grist.org/article/2009-06-03-waxman-markey-bill-breakdown.
38
Some of the industries that would be covered under the House bill include electricity
producers, oil refineries, natural gas suppliers, and energy-intensive businesses focused on
iron, steel, cement, and even paper. Id.
39
Id.
40
See ACELA Summary and Comparison to the ACES Act, Pew Center on Global
Climate
Change,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/acela-summary-aces-actcomparison-oct2009.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
41
The percentage of free allowances would decrease over time. See Amanda DeBard,
CBO: House Climate Bill to Raise $973B, THE WASH. TIMES (June 8, 2009),
37
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represents what some have called “the final absurd expression of the
failed pollution paradigm that has defined climate policy for over a
42
decade.” The bill, while claiming to cut nearly seventeen percent of
emissions by 2020, actually would permit “regulated industries to emit
as much as a third more carbon in 2012 than they did in 2005 and close
43
to ten percent more in 2020.”
The bill from the outset is also subject to the failing concession of
early over-allocation. Aside from over-allocation, the bill also provides
firms with the opportunity to bank as many of these allowances as it
44
wishes. While supporters of the bill would highlight that there is a
strict penalty for exceeding emissions beyond its allowances, the fact is
that the penalty is unlikely to occur since more allowances are
45
distributed than are needed to meet the emission’s target.
The bill fails to establish any sort of stringency aimed at promoting
innovation that will cut GHG emissions dramatically. The bill is set up
to issue out eighty-five percent of allowances for free and only fifteen
percent of the permits would be auctioned off at the start of trading
46
program. According to the EPA, the value of a permit to emit at least
one ton of GHG would be worth around $11 to $15 per ton in 2012 and
47
it would increase to about $22 to $28 per ton in 2025. With over eighty
percent of the allowances being given out for free, the House bill is
forfeiting an exorbitant amount of revenue that can be used for research
and development.
The use of cap and trade to incentivize innovation is the principal
area where cap and trade is flawed. Most proposals that claim that
emissions trading engenders innovation fail to properly define
48
innovation. Some scholars find it helpful to define innovation as
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/08/cbo-house-climate-bill-raise-973b/.
42
Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, The Flawed Logic of the Cap and Trade
Debate, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (May 19, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/print.msp?
id=2153.
43
Id.
44
See Sheppard, supra note 37.
45
The penalty is set to be a fine two times the fair market value of the permits the firm
should have acquired. Id.
46
The percentage of permits auctioned off would increase overtime. See id.
47
By 2012, the value of all permits would be $60 billion and $113 billion in 2025. See
id.
48
Economists characterize innovation as “the commercialization of an invention,” as
distinguished from “diffusion” which is the “adoption of a successful innovation by firms
and individuals.” See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, MOVING TO
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49

involving “both the invention and [the] use of something new.”
Innovation, therefore, requires technological developments to be
50
coupled with a shift in the practices of human behavior. For this
definition to hold true, cap and trade programs would have to strictly
promote innovation whenever a GHG emitter or a firm develops a new
technique in response to that program and then the emitter uses the
51
technique to reduce pollution. The view is that cap and trade makes
the notion of environmental innovation appealing to all the parties
involved in the system because it can “either offer qualitatively better
environmental results or reduce the cost of [meeting] a particular
52
[emissions reduction target].”
Revenue from the fifteen percent of emissions allowances that
would be auctioned off by the federal government in the in first few
years of the Waxman-Markey program would be invested in particular
ways. Roughly fifteen percent would be used to offset greater energy
53
costs for lower income families. Only 1.5 percent would actually be
used to foster research and development for GHG free and energy
54
efficient technology. The bill does not make innovation, which could
reverse the trends of climate change, a priority.
The bill also appears to focus more on adaptation rather than on
mitigation. For instance, two percent of the total revenue from each
year’s auction, compared to the 1.5 percent for research and
development, would be used to help the United States brace itself for
55
the negative effects of climate change from 2012 through 2021. After
that period the total percentage would increase to four percent from
56
2022 through 2026, and eight percent after that. Aside from only
MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LESSONS AFTER 20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, 3
(Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad eds., Oxford University Press 2005), available at
http://www.law.syr.edu/Pdfs/0oxford.pdf.
49
Id.
50
Innovation is best defined by “borrow[ing] a concept found in patent law,” that of
implying a “non-obvious departure from prior practice.” Id.
51
However, this definition also implies that the emitter would “not generally accept
diffusion of techniques invented before the program’s onset as innovations.” Id. The
rationale is, but for a cap and trade’s ability to induce innovation, polluters would not seek
the development and implement of that innovation.
52
Id. at 4.
53
See Sheppard, supra note 37.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
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reserving 1.5 percent for innovation the bill only allots, from 2012 to
2021, 0.5 percent to facilitate the American workforce’s transition away
57
from GHG dependent industries.
Some of the allowances would also be given to corporations not
regulated under the Waxman-Markey legislation. These corporations
would be allowed to sell the allowances and use the revenue for very
specific purposes. The bill provides that thirty percent of these
allowances would be given to local electricity companies, which are
58
typically regulated by state governments. The profit from the sale of
these allowances would be used to sustain low energy prices for
59
consumers.
States would also receive about ten percent of the
allowance but they would be required to use the proceeds to invest in
60
renewable energy and related conservation efforts. The WaxmanMarkey bill fails to establish a meaningful commitment to climate
change focused on innovation because it does not provide substantial
support for development and emissions reduction up front. For
example, the first substantial amount of funds dedicated to new energy
technologies would not come to pass until 2025 when $190 billion
61
would be set aside.
A major flaw of the Waxman-Markey cap and trade system lies
with its allocation of emission credits/allowances. Caps that are not
“adequately stringent” are not likely to be effective even if the caps are
62
met. The over-allocation problem makes cap determinations irrelevant
because there is a lack of will in the political system to set caps at levels
63
that would achieve socially-desirable “environmental goals.” This
imperfection is the easiest to correct. It requires, however, that
lawmakers be courageous and take on the industries that fund their
campaigns. Aside from being the easiest to correct, over-allocation has
the potential to cause the most harm, so as to make the very
57

The percentage would subsequently increase to one percent from 2022 to 2050. Id.
Id.
59
See Sheppard, supra note 37.
60
Id.
61
$90 billion would go towards energy-efficient and renewable energy technologies;
$60 billion would be reserved for carbon-capture and sequestration technology; $20 billion
for electric and other alternative energy automotive technology; and the final $20 billion
would go towards basic scientific research and development. Id.
62
Lesley K. McAllister, The Over Allocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving
toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 397(Spring 2009), available at
http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/assets/pdfs/34.2/7._McAllister_34.2.pdf.
63
Id.
58
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implementation of cap and trade system an unworthy venture. The
effects of over-allocation consist of low allowance prices, deference of
emissions reduction, and the inevitable “buildup of large allowance
64
banks.” One popular approach for correcting the system proneness to
over-allocation is to set caps at levels that require emissions reductions
that are as great as those that “would be achieved by maintaining the use
of technologically and economically feasible emissions control
65
technologies.”
However, the basic problem with this proposed
solution is that it is entirely speculative. It is difficult to know what
types of standards the government would set if it ultimately chooses to
use a cap and trade system over direct regulation. If the government
adopts a cap and trade approach to combat climate change, regulators
would be unable to determine with certainty what technology-based
standards could accomplish without implementing an emissions
reduction system first. Cap and trade, however, would avoid this form
of direct regulation because it relies exclusively on the market to
determine the value of allowances. In essence, this proposed solution
would depend on comparative information that would remain
unavailable if the cap and trade strategy is implemented.
Cap and trade programs, typically, have annual caps determined at
the outset for the duration of the program. Hence, the regulated parties
have the opportunity to know how many allowances they will receive in
66
any given year. It is important to observe that under most existing cap
and trade programs more allowances are issued than are actually
67
necessary. The United States Acid Rain Program (ARP), the Los
Angeles Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), the
Chicago Emissions Reduction Market System (ERMS), and the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) have all suffered
68
from over-allocation of allowances.
This trend of over-allocation
64

Id.
By initially setting stringent caps then overall system caps can be reduced to “levels
warranted by feasibility.” Id. at 398.
66
If the cap and trade program permits “banking,” then firms are able to save unused
allowances for a later time or to trade them in the future. Id.
67
Id.
68
The ARP, credited for having diminished the level of sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions
responsible for the acid deposition of the northeastern United States, had initial set of
allowances allocated by multiplying the emitters’ average fuel consumption during a
baseline time period with an emission rate of 2.5 lbs of SO2 per million BTU. Many of these
firms were issued additional allowance for either installing pollution control devices that
remove pollutants from exhaust streams, voluntarily reducing emissions before the program
65
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demonstrates that caps have traditionally failed to be set at levels that
yield meaningful reductions. In some of the cap and trade programs
mentioned above, “absolute over-allocation” resulted in very few, if
69
any, emissions reductions that could be attributed to the program.
However, most programs suffer from over-allocation during the initial
implementation period. This is ultimately a consequence of politics,
which many times works to garner support for the program but
inevitably concedes the program’s effectiveness.
Over-allocation circumvents the outcome of any cap and trade
program by diminishing the value of allowances. It is basic economics;
whenever allowances exceed the number needed to meet reduction
70
targets their value is reduced. Low allowance prices make ambitious
was implanted, and for “undertaking efficiency and renewable measures.” Most
disappointingly, many of the firms subject to this program were allowed to utilize some of
the system’s “substitution provisions,” which basically allowed emitters to substitute other
units for the units detailed in the statute and therefore qualify for allowances that were
determined by the “historic emissions of those units.”
Under RECLAIM, which is the oldest cap and trade program in the United States,
allowances were also based on the historical annual level of emissions multiplied by a set
emissions rate. RECLAIM, however, differed from ARP in that it determined allocations
based on the highest emissions year over a multi-year period and not on an average. The
problem with RECLAIM was that the baseline period it used suffered from an economic
recession, thus, emitters were not functioning at their highest production levels. The result
was that the allowances allotted were greater than in any of the years highlighted in the
baseline period. RECLAIM was projected to allocate allowances in surplus of real
emissions during its initial years of implementation. However, allowances were issued in
“excess of emissions for five years.”
The ERMS, initiated in 2000 to control volatile organic materials (VOM) in Chicago,
allocated allowances based on emissions in a three year period. Each firm’s “emissions
baseline” was determined by averaging its two greatest levels. The cap for each year was
then set 12% lower than its emissions baseline. The result was that every year allowances
outnumbered emissions. In 2003 and 2004, “emissions were more than 50% below the cap.”
This program also allowed firms to bank allowances for use in subsequent years. In 2003,
firms were able to bank double the number of allowances they used to cover their emissions.
The EU ETS, the world’s first cap and trade program focused on reducing emissions
affecting climate change, has multi-year caps set and it does not have a limit on how many
allowances a firm can bank. The cap was defined by the sum number of allowances
allocated to each European Union state. Most states allocated allowances for free. Only
four states established an auction to disseminate allowances. From 2005 to 2007, over five
percent more allowances were issued than were needed to cover emissions. Id.
69
Absolute over-allocation occurs when emissions are lower than the cap and are
expected to be “lower than the cap in the future such that the price of allowances collapses.”
Id.
70
The market prices for allowances are significant because they signal the “marginal
cost of abatement at the quantity of emissions allowed by the cap.” McAllister, supra note
62, at 398.
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reduction levels less likely to be met. This theory has been proven true
by all of the existing American and European cap and trade programs.
Observations from current cap and trade programs suggests that
allowance prices have been low because of an “overly ample supply of
71
allowances” and not “unanticipated declines in control costs.”
As a consequence of over-allocation, cap and trade programs, as a
72
whole, have been unsuccessful in encouraging innovation. The lack of
innovation under many programs is associated with absolute or early
over-allocation and a lack of strictness, which is overwhelmingly seen
to encourage the largest strides for environmentally sound technological
73
improvements. In order for future cap and trade programs to be
successful and worth the investment, their chief objective must be to
produce significant environmental benefits, not just political posturing
that aims to appease concerns over the harmful effects of industry
practices. In order to achieve this goal, allowances can only be issued
where they would foster a market price that stimulates consequential
74
emissions reductions and technological innovation. Essentially, the
caps in these programs have to be significantly strict. The approach
should look towards regulating the allowance market tightly by
recognizing that cap and trade must create incentives for innovation that
lowers long-term costs. The solution, potentially, could be found in
“rewarding any means of reducing emissions” through the use of newly
75
developed technologies in the short term. Furthermore, the regulations
governing this market should establish a means by which additional
allowances are only issued when the emitters exceed the minimum
reduction targets by a specific percentage.
Avoiding over-allocation is one approach but emission reduction
targets that fail to demonstrate any measure of ambition and boldness
will do little to change the business-as-usual attitude of polluters. Caps
that seek monumental reduction percentages in the immediate term
71

Id.
Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the Mother of Innovation: the Case of SO2
Control, 27 LAW & POL’Y 349–50 (2005).
73
Id. at 350-51.
74
See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 115 (2005).
75
Robert Stavins, Cap-and-Trade Versus the Alternatives for U.S. Climate Policy,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://belfercenter.ksg.havard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=355.
72
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rather than build up to them can force innovation to flourish as well as
correct social behaviors concerning the environment by setting strict
76
and completely feasible standards. Legislation needs to stop being
framed under the guise of low expectations; issues as perilous as climate
77
change require audacity and recognition that sacrifice is necessary. A
program is not sufficiently rigid if its caps do not reflect the most
78
advantageous level of emissions reduction. This is the level at which
the marginal advantage of an extra unit of emission reduction equals the
79
trivial cost incurred by society for making that additional unit. This
standard for setting caps, while ideal, has proven impracticable due to
80
the difficulty of computing social costs. Cap and trade, and the market
forces that guide it, are unlikely to put a value on the “priceless.”
Apart from issuing free allowances, the House bill would allow
emitters to purchase carbon offsets in order to meet a percentage of their
81
emissions target. Essentially, offsets would be used to fund third party
82
clean-energy projects. However, an offset in and of itself will never be

76
Some scholars suggest that these standards can be modeled after those appearing in
the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Some of these standards include the “lowest
achievable emission rate,” the “best available control technology,” the “best available
demonstrated control technology,” and the “best available technology.” McAlister, supra
note 62, at 427.
77
There are federal statutes which require regulators to “base pollution standards on
what is technologically and economically achievable,” rather than to set standards on what
needs to be achieved. See Jason Scott Johnson, Tradable Pollution Permits and the
Regulatory Game, THIRTY YEARS OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION: A RETROSPECTIVE, at 353 (Oxford University Press 2006).
78
Environmental Protection Agency, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND
OPERATING A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL, EPA430-B-03-002, at
A1-A2 (June 2003).
79
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 41-44 (1960).
80
See generally David M. Driesen, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
21 (2003). In order to satisfy caps set at this level polluters would have to decrease
emissions to “[t]he point at which the marginal cost of removing a ton of pollution equals
the social benefit from having that ton removed.” The costs attributed to emissions would
reflect the overall “social and economic value of pollution reduction, creating efficiency in
achieving social welfare.” Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the
Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the
Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 378 (2001).
81
Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized
Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C.J. INT’L & COM. REQ. 851, 861 (2009).
82
Offsets are seen as an innovation of compliance markets. Firms, outside of
purchasing allowances from other covered parties can now also meet their emission cut
target by paying “another entity to cover its emissions when that entity otherwise would not
be required to do so.” Id.
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83

able to succeed in mitigating climate change. Still, Waxman-Markey
would allow offsets to account for up to two billion tons of each year’s
84
total emission cuts. The offset buy-in signals the lawmakers’ failure to
realize that the purpose of a cap and trade system is to cut emissions,
not just offset them. While the Waxman-Markey bill is unlikely to ever
make it to President Obama’s desk anytime soon, there is still a
possibility that some version of it reconciled with some version of the
Senate Boxer-Kerry bill formally known as the Clean Energy Jobs and
85
American Power Act will be passed, and therefore close attention must
be paid to the offset provisions.
Many projections have been made regarding the potential that the
United States will adopt some form of a cap and trade system in the
near future. More importantly is the fact that if such a system is
adopted, a carbon offset market is “projected to grow exponentially
because regulated entities will likely be allowed to meet a significant
86
portion of their targeted reductions through offsets.” In dealing with
the Waxman-Markey and Boxer-Kerry’s inclusion of an offset option it
must be addressed that while at least ten carbon offset programs exist,
each with their own certification standards, to date there is no single
“standardized certification program for carbon offsets” and thus there is
87
a great potential for “fraud in the market.”
In a report released in September of 2008, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) warned of the lack of federal oversight in
88
the carbon offset market.
Without some degree of vigilance in
monitoring offsets certification, any domestic cap and trade program,
especially the Waxman-Markey, will lend itself to racketeering. This is
precisely why the bill had to name the Environmental Protection
83

Id.
The two billion tons worth of offsets may account for up to 15 percent of emission
cuts in 2012 and 33 percent by 2050. See Sheppard, supra note 27.
85
See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s1733/text
86
See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 81, at 864.
87
Id. at 855-56.
88
The GAO report stated that “[t]he proliferation of standards has caused confusion in
the market, and the existence of multiple quality assurance mechanisms with different
requirements raises questions about the quality of offsets available on the voluntary market,
according to many stakeholders.” See id. (citing U.S. Governmental Accountability Office,
Report to Cong. Requesters, Carbon Offsets, The U.S. Market is Growing, but Quality
Assurance Poses Challenges for Market Participants, GAO-08-1048, 56-57, app. VII
(2008)).
84
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Agency (EPA) as the main “adjudicator of what qualifies as a good
89
offset and whether it is being used.” However, the bill’s Senate
counterpart, Boxer-Kerry, offers much less precision in its instruction as
90
to what qualifies as an offset.
The bill’s offset provision hinders its mission of establishing
American leadership in the climate change debate. Currently, high
GHG emitting nations have either not made strong enough
commitments or have just not committed to any reduction at all. India,
like most developing countries, has refused to pledge a reduction of
their emissions until developed nations have not only demonstrated a
91
promise but have made “actual emissions cuts.” In turn, the developed
nations, particularly the United States, have recognized that leadership
is necessary and that a strong commitment on their part must come first.
Nevertheless, the United States and other industrial powers want
some guarantee that their cuts will not be futile if China and India
92
continue with their trend of ever-rising emissions. The WaxmanMarkey bill was to address these concerns by marking U.S. leadership,
which was expected to facilitate commitments from developing nations.
The bill, however, seemingly ignored the effects of offering an
“estimated $13 billion a year,” growing to over $80 billion annually in
2050, to allow GHG emitters to purchase international offset credits
93
from the developing world. Economists have suggested that these
94
offset purchases would prompt “poor countries not to accept caps.”
The bill’s offset provision rewards a developing nation’s unwillingness
to cooperate with emissions reductions all while nurturing the potential
for an international racketeering scheme.
The 219 to 212 close vote count is the one positive thing to take
95
away from the bill’s passage. While partisanship and private interest
89

Russ Choma, Climate Bill Breakdown, GRIST (Oct. 8, 2009, 5:48 AM),
http://grist.org/politics/2009-10-07-climate-bill-breakdown/.
90
Id.
91
William Antholis, India and Climate Change, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124787011359360457.html.
92
Id.
93
Steven Stoft and Dana Kirshner, A Carbon Protect Racket, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (July 27, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/ Commentary/Opinion/2009/0727/
p09s01-coop.html.
94
Purchasing foreign offset credits only compensates international emitters for emitting
“less than they would have emitted,” while applying a cap would cut back on what “they
would have emitted.” Id.
95
See American Clean Air and Security Act of 2009, supra note 11.
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lobbying does deserve most of the credit, vigilance and a healthy dose
of skepticism did play its role. A Democrat from Ohio, Congressman
Dennis Kucinich, explained that he did not vote in favor of the
Democratic plan because the bill was a “fragile compromise, which
96
leads some to claim that we cannot do better.” Passage of the bill,
beyond not producing a quality intervention, creates the illusion that the
97
problem of climate change is being addressed. The legislation asserts
meaningless emission cuts because it does not require reductions below
98
current levels until 2030. The bill does nothing more than “kick the
can down the road, by requiring the bulk of emissions to be carried out
in the long term” and requiring minimal and insignificant cuts in the
99
short term.
Kucinich, and the conscience of the program, were
silenced. The eight amendments that the Congressman sponsored were
100
not allowed to be heard by the entire House of Representatives.
For all it is touted to achieve, the House bill fails to consider the
program’s costs. It is money that could be better spent on ingenuity and
innovation that will change the human behavior that caused the harm to
begin with. If leadership on global climate change is what the
Waxman-Markey bill endeavored to signal, then the people of the world
should be concerned that their leaders will follow suit. The proposed
cap and trade bill is the wrong approach. The responsibility of sincerely
addressing climate change, which then-candidate Obama spoke about,
will continue to remain unappreciated if lackluster measures continue to
101
gain traction at the highest levels of our government. True reforms
96

THE CLEVELAND LEADER, Dennis Kucinich Lays Out Why He Voted Against Clean
Energy Act (June 27, 2009), http://www.clevelandleader.com/node/10478.
97
Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich observed that passage of the bill “only
create[d] the illusion of addressing the problem.” Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. (“We are not only failing to take the action when it is needed to address rapid
global warming, but we are assuming the long term targets will remain intact.”).
100
Three of the amendments sought to minimize the “damage that [would] be done by
offsets,” three others would have required “all federal energy to eventually come from
renewable resources” in order to spearhead the transition to a “green economy,” one
amendment would have moved the year by which GHG cuts were “required from 2030 to
2025” in order to avoid the inefficient use of allowances, and finally the last amendment
would have disqualified “trash incineration” as a means of renewable energy because, as
Rep. Kucinich observes, it is a source of “environmental injustice in the country” since its
harmful health effects are generated in facilities “disproportionately sited in” low income
communities. Interestingly enough, incinerators generally emit more CO 2 “per unit of
electricity produced than coal-fired power plants.” Id.
101
John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
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and steadfast commitments can demonstrate that the “global political
system is not unlike the global climate system, changes here make
102
changes there.”
The House’s cap and trade system is deemed an attractive option
because it appears to be less “punitive” than a direct carbon tax and
103
“more responsive” to market conditions. However, as the European
Union’s experience with its trading system can show, the flexibility to
respond to market conditions allows for a decrease in carbon value. The
diminishing value of carbon causes the market pressure to reduce
104
emission to waiver. One potential solution to this problem is to avoid
establishing cap levels for the full duration of the program. Although
setting caps in advance has earned a lot of support because it allows
firms to have a “predictable environment for making compliance
105
decisions, this approach has some drawbacks.” Setting future caps at
the outset of the program makes such caps impassive to unexpected
environmental
developments,
economic
circumstances,
and
technological development.
The cap and trade system that made its way through the House and
began to be formulated in the Senate in early 2010 fashioned an
imperfect solution to calamitous threat. These shortcomings, however,
are not immune from cap and trade’s more popular alternatives. The
carbon tax, with all its limitations however, can provide better results,
all while avoiding the flaws plaguing cap and trade’s implementation.
A tax-based climate change control program can “provide stronger and
more stable incentives than [Congress’] cap-and-trade approach to get
business and households to transition to low-carbon technologies and
106
fuels.”
A carbon tax also addresses cap and trade’s inability to
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html
102
The Wages of Waxman-Markey, THE ECONOMIST (July 6, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/07/the_wages_of_waxmanmar
key (suggesting that while the Waxman-Markey bill “won’t save the world alone” it can
“change the political dynamics” affecting climate change policy).
103
Stop the Vote! Can a Cap-and-Trade System Really Work to Reduce Emission in the
U.S.,
ENVIRONMENTAL
NEWS
NETWORK
(Dec.
6,
2007,
9:04
AM),
http://www.enn.com/pollution/article/26684/print.
104
It becomes “cheaper to purchase credits instead of reducing [GHG emissions].” Id.
105
See Stavins, supra note 30, at 299, 307 (arguing that weighing equally the integrity
of long term emission reduction targets and the programs flexibility “is an important issue
for the success [of any cap and trade program]”).
106
Robert J. Shapiro and Elaine C. Kamarck, A Carbon Tax Would Be Sunnier,
POLITCO (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30348.html.
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account for the volatility of carbon prices. Conversely, a carbon tax sets
a definitive price so that companies can “figure how much they might
earn by developing climate-friendly fuels and technologies” and both
they and consumers at large “can calculate how much [can] be saved by
107
adopting them.”
Some scholars also suggest that the carbon tax is a more stable
alternative over cap and trade when considered in the context of the
108
world’s current “financial market problem[s].” The House program
would essentially “create $1 trillion in new financial instruments—the
emission permits for almost every form of energy—that would
immediately be transformed into securities and derivatives and then
109
traded on Wall Street.”
A carbon tax avoids this scenario because
there are no permits to trade, and thus it evades the fiasco of “increasing
incidents of manipulation and insider trading” that has plagued the
110
European Trading Scheme. This alternative approach, of course, will
not be invulnerable to special interest lobbying. However, because a
carbon tax is “easier to understand . . . special-interest horse trading,
and other attempts to wrangle exemptions will be much more obvious,”
111
and as a result adoption this measure will be much more transparent.
Finally, both the House and Senate’s cap and trade programs are
weak proposals because they do not adhere to the “economic-induced
112
innovation hypothesis.” If the theory holds true, then tough ambitious
regulation, regardless if it comes in the form of a market-based
instrument, needs to raise the cost of “routine compliance” in order to
113
facilitate innovation aimed at avoiding the high costs of adherence. A
trading scheme that does not implement such a strategy will never
encourage immeasurably needed innovation. Even innovation that
would assure “long-term efficiency and enormous environmental
114
improvement” would be unlikely produced.
107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Shapiro & Kamarck, supra note 86.
112
Induced innovation hypothesis is an economic theory that suggests that high costs
will tend to encourage innovation. See Driesen, supra note 34, at 6.
113
Id.
114
Empirical data observes that trading is unlikely to facilitate even significantly
inexpensive developments. Under most cap and trade programs only innovation that costs
less than the “marginal cost of additional reductions at facilities with relatively low control
costs can find a market.” Id. at 28.
108
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II. AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING TO
CLIMATE CHANGE
In practice, both the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer cap and
trade systems would fail to assert an ethical obligation between people,
government, and their planet. These systems are plagued with flaws
that make them susceptible to status quo thinking and ethical
indifference. Any proposal to combat the harms of climate change must
be framed around the moral implications that arise from inaction or
ineffectiveness.
Any mitigating measure must be in sync with the emerging climate
justice movement. Climate justice’s purpose is to deal with the concerns
that arise from “the intersection of climate change with race, poverty,
115
and preexisting environmental risks.”
The American response to
climate change and its inevitable effects has not taken seriously the
potentially devastating impacts that it and inadequate policies aimed at
addressing it will have on poor and of-color communities.
Unfortunately, despite the hopes of some, the recent discourse on
climate change in the United States has not seriously pondered the
116
plight of those most overlooked.
There are views, however, which suggest that a cap and trade
program can be salvaged, but only if it takes a hard-line stance in favor
of environmental justice by incorporating a domestic clean development
mechanism (CDM). CDMs are capable of producing extraordinary
benefits. It would allow for “poor and of-color communities” to have a
voice in the cap and trade market that would “otherwise exclude
117
them”.
These communities would be able to establish offsetting
projects that would be consistent with new policy and improve the
conditions of their communities simultaneously. This measure would
ultimately allow the United States to take responsibility for its
contributions to climate change all while addressing the domestic
inequalities that have been overlooked for far too long. In doing so, any
federal response to climate change would not so quickly fall victim to
criticism that it is not “recogniz[ing] the direct kinship between social
115
Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a
Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 170 (2008).
116
There is a supported view that legislators “crafting climate rules in Congress and
beyond will have an unparalleled opportunity to implement policy that accounts for climate
justice concerns,” but that window is closing rapidly. Id. at 171.
117
Id. at 172.
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inequality and environmental degradation.”
Ultimately, in order for there to be any sincere attention to the
social destruction that climate change will inevitably bring, a moral shift
must emerge amongst the leaders and policymakers of the world. To
date it appears as though both developing and industrial nations are
119
suffering from a lack of moral conviction. It is a deficiency that has
produced the shortsightedness of legislative and economic proposals.
The focus of any plan must stem from the admission that to go forth
with the same attitude that has produced such grave harm would be
immoral. This notion is ethically justifiable because as Donald Brown
asserts:
[D]istributive justice demands that the burdens of reducing a
problem either be shared equally or based upon merit or
deservedness, there is no conceivable equitably based formula that
would allow the United States to continue to emit at existing levels
120
once it is understood that steep reductions are called for.

The greatest disappointment of the Waxman-Markey bill is that it
refuses to make the difficult political decision that just happens to be the
easiest ethical one. The bill both postpones the essential and ignores
attempts to perfect its inherent inadequacies. It does not recognize that
time is running out and that emissions cuts delayed will not be able to
account for the aggregate concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.
Many scientists and policy makers believe that a doubling of CO2
from pre-industrial levels to 560 [parts per million] ppm may be
unavoidable in the 21st century. This is so because the world’s
political and economic system cannot respond rapidly enough to
make faster changes in some major polluting sources such as
gasoline-powered automobiles or coal-fired power plants. . . . Even if
all nations could have stabilized emissions in the year 2002, the
concentrations of GHGs would continue to rise and would approach
500 ppm by the year 2100. After that, GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere would continue to rise for several hundred years before
stabilization would be achieved. Even to stabilize CO2 at 1,000 ppm
121
will require reductions of emissions below current levels.

The acknowledgement that climate change solutions require moral
118

Id. at 193.
Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit
Global Warming Commitments, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10741, 10762 (2002).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 10756.
119
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commitments will yield unprecedented results. CDMs, in particular,
will be vital in harnessing such promises. They will be instrumental for
“attracting an increased flow of investments to green EJ development
zones and stimulating technology transfers to communities that might
not otherwise benefit from these [innovations] in their early
122
development and dissemination phases.”
The CDM approach,
however, is nowhere near perfect. This approach still hinges on the
social sensitivities of a market that has proven itself unforgiving.
Nevertheless, environmental scholars contend that without a domestic
CDM, a “cap-and-trade approach will very likely repeat many old and
123
dangerous mistakes.”
“Carbon-trading,” if not coupled with some
assurance of climate justice, will inevitably aggravate the “negative
124
effects of the co-pollutants that result from the same source.”
On the eve of the United Nations Climate Change Summit in
Copenhagen, ethical considerations have become much more
pronounced in the climate change debate in the United States Congress.
As a result, a potential compromise has emerged between those who
favor cap and trade and those who prefer a carbon tax. On December
11, 2009, Democratic Senator Maria Cantwell and her Republican cosponsor Senator Susan Collins introduced the Carbon Limits and
Energy for America’s Renewal Act (“CLEAR”) which calls for the
125
implementation of a cap and refund system. The CLEAR Act offers a
potentially “attractive and effective climate policy alternative to
126
traditional cap-and-trade or carbon tax policies.”
The bill already
surpasses Waxman-Markey and the Senate’s Kerry-Boxer bill in terms
127
of “simplicity, transparency, and equity.”
The bill, which is thirty-nine pages in length, would establish an
“upstream cap on fossil carbon,” a 100 percent auction open “only to
energy producers and importers (and not Wall Street) with prices set by
the market within a bounded price collar,” and an “equal monthly

122

Burkett, supra note 95, at 222.
Id.
124
Examples of co-pollutants include “toxic and cancer-causing hydrocarbons, mercury,
and particulate matter.” Id. at 234.
125
Sen. Maria Cantwell, The CLEAR Act: A Cap & Refund Approach to Energy
Independence and Climate Change Mitigation, U.S. SEN. MARIA CANTWELL, 1 (Dec. 10,
2009), http://cantwell.senate.gov/issues/CLEAR%20Act%20Overview%20Memo.pdf.
126
Id.
127
Id.
123
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distribution of auction revenues to every American.”
The bill
recognizes the need for climate change policy to reflect a degree of
ethical responsiveness. CLEAR streamlines funding for clean energy
research and development, programs that mitigate non-CO2 greenhouse
gas emissions, and “needs-based regionally-specific assistance for
129
communities and workers transitioning to a clean energy economy.”
The bill also appears to signal a stronger commitment to emissions
reduction by not allowing offsets and thus “remov[ing] some of the
incentive for American companies [not] to make the transition to a low130
carbon [and GHG-free] way of doing business.”
The CLEAR Act’s focus on an “upstream point of regulation”
(producer/importer level), recognizes that there are fewer entities to
regulate at that level and, as a result, there will be “fewer opportunities
to game the system if the cost of allowances is imposed before fossil
fuels are distributed among the many different energy-intensive
131
industries.”
Furthermore, this bill, unlike Waxman-Markey and
132
Kerry-Boxer, auctions the allowances from the outset. The auction
process is also much more tightly regulated. The allowances are
“tradable only among [producers/importers] and only via a government133
hosted exchange with publicly listed prices.” The price of allowances
at auction is another distinct feature between CLEAR and its
congressional counterparts. The bill limits the price of allowances by
134
“both a floor and a ceiling (commonly known as price collar).” In the
first years of the auction the prices would range between $7 and $21,
but the bill provides for “an adjustment mechanism that would raise the
135
band” to $16 to $40 by 2025, and to about $75 to $160 by 2050.
Additionally, the bill would require that “75 percent of auction revenue
128
Id. The CLEAR Act keeps the emissions reduction targets outlined in the WaxmanMarkey, bill but it does not rely on “free allowances to industry, unverifiable offsets, or
other giveaways.” Id.
129
Id.
130
Craig Gannett & Lauren Giles Wishnie, Climate Change: Sen. Cantwell Introduces
Alternatives to Gap and Trade, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.dwt.com/LearningCenter/Advisories?find=168218 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. Earlier supporters of the CLEAR Act observe that the pricing mechanism creates
predictability, which will make it easer “for businesses to plan for and finance the necessary
investments.” Id.
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be returned to consumers” in the form of “nontaxable monthly cash
dividend paid on an equal per-capita basis to all legal residents of the
136
United States.”
The remaining twenty-five percent of auction revenue, although
not returned to consumers, will be invested into a Clean Energy
137
Reinvestment Trust Fund (CERT).
The Fund is meant to help
“accelerate the nation’s urgently needed transition to a cleaner twentyfirst century energy system and other climate-change-related priorities,”
and as a result signals an unprecedented commitment to being ethically
138
responsive in the implementation of climate change policies. CERT
would use existing Congressional budget and appropriations processes
“exclusively to finance a variety of critical climate mitigation and
adaptation programs as well as programs designed or administered by
the Clean Energy Deployment Administration” while assuring that the
139
implementation of the CLEAR Act remains deficit-neutral.
The
anticipated use of the Fund would include: (1) providing “transition
assistance to affected industries and workers experiencing economic
dislocation due to climate change efforts”; (2) providing “mitigation and
adaptation assistance to communities experiencing negative impacts
from climate change”; (3) supporting “training programs to prepare
workers for careers in energy efficiency, renewable energy and clean
technology”; and (4) supporting “low-income energy efficiency loan
140
programs.”
136

Gannett & Giles Wishnie, supra note 130.
See Cantwell, supra note 125, at 6.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See Gannet & Giles Wishnie, supra note 130. The CERT Fund would also include
investments for: “(A) targeted and region-specific compensation for early retirement of
carbon-intensive facilities, machinery, or related assets in the United States that are stranded
by new market dynamics; (B) mitigation of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide
from fossil carbon and non-greenhouse substances that exacerbate or accelerate climate
change (such as black carbon); (C) cost-effective domestic and international projects that
verifiably reduce, avoid, or sequester greenhouse gas emissions, such as agriculture,
forestry, or other land use practices; (D) investments in low and no carbon energy and fuels
research, development, and deployment activities; (E) projects or initiatives that verifiably
increase energy efficiency or energy productivity; (F) projects or initiatives that support
residential fuel switching, particularly home heating oil; (G) weatherization and energy
efficiency improvements of low-income and public buildings; (H) funding for climate
change mitigation and adaptation projects, activities and research to increase the resilience
of human populations and communities, fish and wildlife, and managed and unmanaged
terrestrial, aquatic and marine ecosystems; (I) cost-effective projects that provide adaptation
services in areas and countries in which climate change or ocean acidification impacts are
137
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The ethical complications that emerge from the use of a cap and
trade system are directly associated with this approach’s exclusive focus
on overall reduction instead of equitable concerns related to the systems
141
“distributional effects.”
Without directly addressing the disparate
impacts of GHG emissions, any political decision on climate change
policy will condemn future generations with a burden that should
142
belong to the present generation. Ultimately, cap and trade fails to
meet the ethical duty to respond to climate change because it stands for
the proposition that such a duty can only be fostered with a profit
143
making incentive. The CLEAR Act in its initial form appears to
salvage the ethical integrity of a domestic climate change policy. The
bill recognizes the urgency of the moment and establishes an ethical
framework for altering the societal behaviors that have led to climate
change.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: CAP AND TRADE AND ITS
ETHICAL IMPASSIVENESS
Fixing rights and duties theory to emissions trading reveals that
because “the right to a clean environment exists as a statement of
144
positive law; a corresponding duty exists among others not to pollute.”
In fact, international and domestic laws demonstrate that the right to
live in a clean environment is legally cognizable, while no such right is

likely to be most severe; and (J) programs that protect or advocate for energy consumers
relating to changes in rates and services as a result of the CLEAR Act.” See Cantwell, supra
note 125, at 7.
141
Gannet & Giles Wishnie, supra note 130.
142
“If we wait forty or fifty years before taking serious action, the die will have been
cast and a thousand generations of our descendants will have to live with the consequences
of the climate we bequeathed them.” R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change: A Catastrophe in
Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 580 (2006).
143
Consider that fact that giving allowances to polluters will create windfall profits for
those firms. These high-scale profits would result because cap and trade programs, as a
Congressional Budget Office report reveals, “still result in higher prices for consumers and
households but would not impose additional cost on [emitting] firms. Even if the companies
received allowances for free, they would raise prices to their customers because the cost of
using an emission allowance for production—rather than selling it to another firm—would
be embodied in the prices that they would charge for their goods and services.” Peter R.
Orszag, Testimony: Approaches to Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/87xx/doc8769/11-01-co2emissions.pdf.
144
Kirk W. Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L.
149, 170 (2006).
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145

recognized for polluting.
Nevertheless, proposals to establish a
system of accountability fail to recognize this assertion. The WaxmanMarkey bill claims that the cap and trade system will help reconfigure
the way Americans use and make energy through the half-century mark.
Unfortunately, Waxman-Markey will accomplish no such thing. It is
even unlikely that it will achieve its primary goal of substantially
cutting GHG emissions and turning around the trend of climate
146
change.
Michael Hoexter describes cap and trade programs as “ethical
trap[s],” for they reassert the view that markets are better than
147
government.
The notion appears ever more ironic in light of the
financial debacle that world has borne witness to in the last year. The
people of the world have been able to tap into the market’s ability to
generate wealth at an imaginable rate but they too have seen that if not
regulated, a market will act on its fundamental impulse to use
“resources profligately and without regard for its impacts in search of
148
short-term favorable return on investments.”
The only thing
Waxman-Markey succeeds in doing is avoiding what direct government
regulation can do, stamp a vote of no-confidence on business-as usual
attitudes.
If Waxman-Markey, or some form of it, becomes the law of the
149
land, then Congressman Kucinich’s fear will become reality. Cap and
trade signals reluctance on the part of government to “take direct
150
responsibility for carbon mitigation.”
In this system, the
government’s accountability will be limited to setting the cap, and from
that point forward, the carbon market takes the reins by determining
145

A vast number of laws and constitutions around the world “recognize the right of a
legal person to enjoy a healthy or clean environment,” but “nowhere will one find the act of
polluting the natural environment explicitly established as a right for any legal person . . . in
any international or municipal source of law.” Id. at 161-63.
146
John Entine, The Last Word: U.S. Climate Bill-Cap-and-Trade Catastrophe,
ETHICAL
CORPORATION,
(Sep.
15,
2009),
http://www.jonentine.com/
ethical_corporation/2009_09_US_Climate_Bill_Cap-and-trade.htm
147
Michael Hoexter, Cap and Trade Derails Climate Ethics the Motive Force of
Carbon Mitigation—Part 2, FUTURELAB (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.futurelab.net/blogs
/marketing-strategy-innovation/2010/03/cap_and_trade_derails_climate_.html_0.
148
Id. (arguing that cap and trade is an “effort to clothe the administrative and ethical
role of government in the supposed ethics and/or efficiency of markets, in this case, the
carbon permit market.”).
149
Rep. Kucinich observed that “passing a weak bill today gives us a weak
environmental policy tomorrow.” See Soft & Kirshner, supra note 93.
150
See Hoexter, supra note 147.
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carbon prices.
In the end, cap and trade makes it very difficult to discern who is
responsible for climate protection, as the government will always be
able to place fault in the market that it initially entrusted. Hoexter
suggests that many may view the system’s ability to “[insulate] climate
policy from the vicissitudes of politics” as positive, but in reality all that
this insulation does is make a nation’s climate policy “ineffectual, nontransparent, and corruptible by system stakeholders who are interested
151
in maintaining a fossil fueled status quo.” The process by which low
GHG and GHG-free technologies are put in place to aid the cut of
emissions will be directly controlled by market forces.
Cap and trade, as designed under Waxman-Markey and KerryBoxer, will never succeed in achieving an equitable reduction of GHGs.
It will not foster the ingenuity and innovation that is necessary when it
is needed the most. Weak caps and the over-allocation of allowances
will never create profound commitments to cut emissions. The system
institutes no incentive for firms to cut their pollution levels beyond what
the cap already requires them to do. In essence, cap and trade lacks the
impetus necessary for a moral and ethical response to climate change to
152
take hold.
The Waxman-Markey bill would allow start-up firms to acquire up
153
to two billion offset credits every year. The two billion tons of carbon
dioxide that these offsets represent account for a greater percentage than
154
the reduction that the bill would require each year through 2026.
“[U]sing this quantity of offsets would allow capped emitters as a whole
155
to increase their emissions by [thirty eight percent] by 2012.” Even
more preposterous is the fact that firms would not have to reduce their
151

Id. After the cap is set, Waxman-Markey, along with all the other carbon cap and
trade system proposals, dares to suggest that the “supposedly impersonal forces of the
market will determine the outcome; within the policy’s design by intention no agent is
simultaneously directing the investments process and responsive to the calls for climate
action.” Id.
152
Cap and trade systems merely establish a floor. That is to say, once a firm’s
emissions are below the cap they have “no incentive to do better.” See Why Hansen is Right:
Cap-and-Trade
will
Make
the
Climate
Problem
Worse,
Not
Better,
http://dl.getdropbox.com/u/390139/ifr/cap%20and%20trade.doc (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
153
Bill Barclay & Patrick McCully, Initial Analysis of Offsets Provisions in the Draft of
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS (Apr. 15,
2009), http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/WaxmanIRRAN.pdf.
154
Id.
155
Id.
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emissions back to 2005 levels for nearly two decades. Furthermore, “if
all eligible offsets were used, the [twenty percent] reduction supposed to
happen by 2020 would not actually be reached until 2036, [and] the
reduction in 2050 would be only [fifty percent] rather than the stated
156
[eighty-three percent].”
The shortcomings of a traditional cap and trade approach are not
based on speculation. This market solution’s inability to address climate
change is clear to anyone who reviews how the system is meant to
function. Even cap and trade’s creator, Dr. Thomas Crocker, has stated
that he is “skeptical that cap-and-trade is the most effective way to go
157
about regulating carbon.” Crocker’s doubt is based on the position
that cap and trade is “better suited for discrete, local pollution
158
problems.”
Cap and trade is also ineffective in combating climate
change because economists have been unable to quantify the economic
damage of climate change. Therefore, “without knowing how costly
climate change is,” the market would be unable to correctly determine
159
“how tight a grip to put on emissions.”
The founder of cap and trade has recognized the system as
ineffective in taking on the challenge of curbing climate change. What
is needed is direct government regulation that establishes a moral duty
not to emit harmful pollutants that risk placing our planet in peril
coupled with a tax aimed at punishing those who breach that duty.
Crocker has suggested than an “outright tax on emissions” is much
more desirable because it would be “easier to enforce and [would
provide the] need[ed] flexibility to deal with the problem” of climate
160
change.
A carbon tax/emissions penalty would impose a duty on
emitters, and would channel an ethical perspective that suggests that
156

Id. at 4.
Jon Hilsenrath, Cap-and-Trade’s Unlikely Critics: Its Creators, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125011380094927137.html.
158
Id.
159
See Hoexter, supra note 147.
160
Id. “Within the relatively efficient category of approaches that rely on the power of
markets, a tax on emissions is generally more efficient than a cap-and-trade system. The
reason is that although both a tax and a cap-and-trade system encourage firms to find the
lowest-cost reductions at a particular point in time, a tax provides greater flexibility over
time, allowing firms to achieve reductions when they are least expensive. In particular, a tax
encourages firms to make greater reductions in emissions at times when the cost of doing so
is low and allows them leeway to lessen their efforts when the cost is high.” See Peter R.
Orzag, Implications of a Cap-and-Trade Program for Carbon Dioxide Emissions, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9134/04-24Cap_Trade_Testimony.pdf.
157
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individuals are willing to penalize human behavior that puts all life at
161
harm.
While the United Nations Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen
failed to produce a legally binding commitment to reduce GHG
emissions, it has reframed the debate as an ethical issue. The ethics of
climate change were inserted into the fold before the negotiations even
began. To improve the likelihood that a global climate agreement could
be reached at the Copenhagen conference, European Union leaders
agreed to pay $10.5 billion over three years to help developing countries
162
in the battle against global warming. The developing world is seeking
a long-term financing pledge for more than $100 billion each year from
the industrial powers who have not yet answered how much they would
163
offer in the long term. In the days leading to the Copenhagen Summit,
the United Nations confirmed that the European Union’s pledge to
support a global climate fund is up to $30 billion, the largest investment
164
commitment to date.
Copenhagen’s inability to produce a binding agreement does not
make it a failure. The United States, after years of standing
indifferently against concerns of worsening climate change, helped form
a consensus at the eleventh hour of the two-week negotiation. The
agreement that was presented to the conference, facilitated by President
Obama and the heads of state from China, India, Brazil, and South
Africa, did not meet the goal of constructing a binding international
treaty for 2010, provoking the most influential nations to acknowledge
165
that there is a crisis and to began implementing domestic responses.
The accord provides a system for monitoring and reporting
progress toward those national pollution-reduction goals, a compromise
on an issue over which China bargained hard. It calls for hundreds of
billions of dollars to flow from wealthy nations to those countries most
vulnerable to a changing climate. And it sets a goal of limiting the
global temperature rise to two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels
161

See Hoexter, supra note 147.
James Kanter & Andrew C. Revin, Europe Pledges Billions in Climate Funding,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
11,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/
science/earth/12climate.html?scp=17&sq=climate% 20change&st=cse.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/ science/earth/19climate.html?
scp=3&sq=climate%0change&st=cse.
162
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by 2050, implying deep cuts in climate-altering emissions over the next
166
four decades.
While it is true that the plan does not commit industrialized or
developing nations to specific goals for midterm and long-term
emissions cutbacks, the measure is significant. It legitimizes the pledge
of nations to work to control the progression of global warming, as it
concedes that economic self-interest must no longer stall discussions on
167
mitigating the harms of climate change.
Not everyone is as optimistic about the symbolism of the
Copenhagen meetings and, to a certain degree, with proper reason.
Andreas Carlgren, the environment minister of Sweden, said that the
“summit meeting had been a ‘great failure’ partly because other nations
had rejected targets and a timetable for the rest of the world to sign on
168
to binding emissions reductions.” The European Union went into the
conference hoping to lead by example on emission cuts, but it has been
greatly criticized by environmental and industrial groups for not
169
directing other nations to follow suit.
The shortcomings of the
Summit, however, should not eclipse the reality that climate change
discussions are progressing. The discussion leading to Copenhagen,
and following it, has forced climate change to be framed as a global
170
ethical issue. Developed nations, like the United States, can no longer
excuse their positions on climate change on account of “national
171
interest.” These nations will have to conform their national policies to
what ethics, justice, and human rights demand of them. For example,
each nation would be required to make an individual climate change
policy that is equal to its fair share of emissions. Although there may be
some disagreements as to what is fair, an ethical view would eliminate
excuses that climate change policies may impose new costs or put
172
certain industries at risk financially.

166

Id.
Id.
168
James Kanter, E.U. Blames Others for ‘Great Failure’ on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
22,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/world/europe/23ihtclimate.html?
scp=25&sq=climate%20change&st=cese.
169
Id.
170
Donald A. Brown, Two Climate Change Matters Move to Center Stage in
Copenhagen with Profound Implications for Developed Nations: Ethics and Adaptation,
ROCK ETHICS INST., http://climateethics.org/?p=331 (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
171
Id.
172
Id.
167
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In the United States, for instance, opposition to climate change
legislation asserts that a “proposed bill [would] hurt the coal industry in
a coal state, a position that seems to ignore the responsibility of people
173
in coal states to protect poor people in Africa from climate change.”
However, a glimmer of hope has emerged in the United States Senate.
The Cantwell-Collins measure addresses the deep-seated ethical
complications of past climate change policy proposals by implementing
174
an ethical conscience cap and refund system. The bill would return
the majority of the revenue collected from setting a price on carbon
175
emissions to consumers who will be paying higher costs for energy.
The average household is expected to receive an annual tax-free refund
176
of about $1,100. One quarter of the revenue collected will “be used
for clean energy research, assistance to hard-hit communities, energy
efficiency programs and reductions in greenhouse gases other than
177
carbon dioxide.” Cantwell-Collins recognizes what Waxman-Markey
and Kerry-Boxer have ignored. That is, if the issue is an ethical one, no
nation can ignore its obligation to others around the world or its own
178
most at risk regions in developing polices for climate change.
Without implementing a measure that creates an ethical duty, no
substantial shifts in human activity will emerge. This duty is essential if
any of the world’s governments are truly serious about addressing
climate change. This duty is necessary because it asserts what basic
contract law declares, that “‘where a party does or promises to do what
he is already legally obligated to do or promises to refrain from doing or
refrains from doing what he is not legally privileged to do he has not
incurred detriment’” because his activity is founded on a pre-existing
179
duty. Without establishing a duty “upon which the parties agree, there
180
is a failure of consideration and thus a failure of contract.”
The
contract would create a duty between humans to safeguard their planet,
and ultimately their home. This duty, which would never emerge under
173

Id.
John M. Broder, Senators Offer New Climate Proposals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2009), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/senators-offer-new-climate-proposals/.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id..
179
See Junker, supra note 144 at 169 (quoting Joseph D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo,
The Law of Contracts, § 4.9 (West, 4th ed. 1998)).
180
Id.
174
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a cap and trade system, recognizes the human right to a clean and
protected environment. What emerges then is an ethical commitment to
preserve the planet that welcomed life and not defer that responsibility
to future world. Copenhagen’s inability to conclude with a binding
treaty should not overshadow the recent domestic developments that
have taken a much more transparent and meaningful climate change
policy. The Senate Cantwell-Collins CLEAR Act, a refreshing
alternative to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer, imposes immediate
obligations, placing the protection of our planet “in the public trust[,
which] cannot be sold by the government nor licensed for sale by the
181
government.”

181

Id. at 166.

